|Title||The Rise of Majority-Ethnic Nationalism and Social Cohesion among Marginalised Groups: Experimental Evidence from India|
|C1 Background and Explanation of Rationale||Rising majority-ethnic nationalism -- a trend witnessed across the globe -- threatens the material and symbolic status of ethnic minorities by questioning their status as `true' national members. A common threat to group status is generally thought to unite threatened groups under a common banner, strengthening identification and enhancing cooperation. However, marginalised minorities do not always respond to group threats in concert. On the contrary, a threatening environment sometimes results in fragmentation and intra-group competition. Through cooperation games in a laboratory setting in the field, this study aims to shed light on the conditional effect of status threat on intra-group cohesion among Muslims in India. By randomly assigning a prime that devalues the Muslim identity according to the Hindu nationalist narrative, as well as a status division within a group of Muslim participants, the study highlights the moderating effect of within-group status divisions on cooperation among marginalised groups.|
|C2 What are the hypotheses to be tested?||
Hypotheses are included in the pre-analysis plan. We study (1) whether the prime (devaluing group status) increases differences in the probability of cooperating in a prisoner’s dilemma and contributing in a dictator game between high and low status group members (2) whether the prime increases cooperation/contributions among low status group members to low status counterparts, but not to high status counterparts and (3) whether an increase in stakes increases cooperation when stakes are distributed symmetrically, but not when they are distributed asymmetrically.
We will predict the probability of cooperation/levels of contributions among primed/non-primed participants of high and low status to in and out-group members.
|C3 How will these hypotheses be tested? *||Through randomly assigning a prime devaluing the common group status, priming individuals with their high/low financial status and assigning the high/low status of counterparts in prisoner dilemma and dictator games.|
|C5 Scale (# of Units)||300 participants|
|C6 Was a power analysis conducted prior to data collection?||Yes|
|C7 Has this research received Insitutional Review Board (IRB) or ethics committee approval?||Yes|
|C8 IRB Number||FE_0017|
|C9 Date of IRB Approval||05/03/2019|
|C10 Will the intervention be implemented by the researcher or a third party?||Researchers|
|C11 Did any of the research team receive remuneration from the implementing agency for taking part in this research?||No|
|C12 If relevant, is there an advance agreement with the implementation group that all results can be published?||No|
|C13 JEL Classification(s)||not provided by authors|