|Title||Information and Accountability: Evidence from India|
|C1 Background and Explanation of Rationale||
In recent years many developing democracies have substantially improved access to public schooling and have seen significant increases in school enrolment. While this has been a significant achievement, many children in public schools still perform well below expected learning levels. In India, for example, over 60 percent of children aged 6-14 cannot read at the second grade level, despite primary school enrolment rates of over 95 percent. It is clear that citizens in India do care for access to high quality education. Moreover, they are often aware of low levels of learning in govern- ment schools and do express disapproval of government facilities (Dreze and Sen 1995). Yet these concerns do not translate into political demands for improvements in public education, in the way that concerns over the provision of other public services lead to demands for goods such as roads, electricity or water (cite something to support this in India, i.e. that citizens care about, and vote for, the provision of other public goods).
|C2 What are the hypotheses to be tested?||In this study we use experimental methods in the context of New Delhi, India to examine (a) whether attribution is a problem that makes citizens less likely to raise demands for education and less likely to prefer or vote for candidates that promise improvements on education; and (b) whether information can improve attribution and consequently raise citizens’ demands for improvements to education. We provide information on attribution for responsibility for education inputs in government schools in Delhi and examine whether this leads voters to (a) correctly attribute responsibility for these inputs; (b) increase political demands for education inputs; and (c) political participation and interest; (d) prefer candidates that emphasise education inputs over candidates that emphasise other policies in their campaign promises. Finally, because we use a realistic partisan medium for the information treatment (a voice message recorded by an incumbent politician), we are also able to examine whether party affiliation conditions the impact of information on citizen choices. We also use the baseline (and control group) conjoint to analyse how the role of demographics such as, caste, gender, occupation, political backgrounds and political experience feature into voter choice. This has remained unexamined in urban Indian context.|
|C3 How will these hypotheses be tested? *||
The objective of the proposed research is to investigate whether attribution is a problem that makes citizens less likely to raise demands for education and less likely to prefer / vote for candidates that promise improvements on education. Attribution remains unexamined in the Indian context. Apart from general descriptive that suggest attribution may be a problem, specific data is lacking.
|C5 Scale (# of Units)||For pilot – 60-90 HHs, For full study – 1000 HHs|
|C6 Was a power analysis conducted prior to data collection?||Yes|
|C7 Has this research received Insitutional Review Board (IRB) or ethics committee approval?||Yes|
|C8 IRB Number||This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee (Reference number: R58325/RE001).|
|C9 Date of IRB Approval||20/07/2018|
|C10 Will the intervention be implemented by the researcher or a third party?||Morsel Agency|
|C11 Did any of the research team receive remuneration from the implementing agency for taking part in this research?||No|
|C12 If relevant, is there an advance agreement with the implementation group that all results can be published?||not provided by authors|
|C13 JEL Classification(s)||not provided by authors|