

Information and Accountability: Evidence from India

Pre-analysis plan

Tanushree Goyal¹

Robin Harding²

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¹DPhil Candidate, University of Oxford (email: tanushree.goyal@nuffield.ox.ac.uk).

²Associate Professor of Government, University of Oxford (email: robin.harding@politics.ox.ac.uk).

1 Background

In recent years many developing democracies have substantially improved access to public schooling and have seen significant increases in school enrolment. While this has been a significant achievement, many children in public schools still perform well below expected learning levels. In India, for example, over 60 percent of children aged 6-14 cannot read at the second grade level, despite primary school enrolment rates of over 95 percent. It is clear that citizens in India do care for access to high quality education. Moreover, they are often aware of low levels of learning in government schools and do express disapproval of government facilities (Dreze and Sen 1995). Yet these concerns do not translate into political demands for improvements in public education, in the way that concerns over the provision of other public services lead to demands for goods such as roads, electricity or water.

This problem raises an important question about the limits to democratic accountability. *Why do citizens who are dissatisfied with the quality of public education not voice demand for its improvement by their elected representatives?* Such low levels of political salience of a service that is poorly provided and has a high impact on citizen welfare is puzzling. Most studies of democratic accountability focus on whether voters punish or reward politicians for services that they deliver. By evaluating and rewarding policies that incumbents delivers, voters ensure that policymakers invest in those policies and enhance overall welfare. This potential welfare enhancing effect of democracy requires voters to raise demands for improvements in public services; absent voter demands for services as crucial as education input it is not a surprise that governments overlook the provision of these inputs. Despite the potential gravity of this problem, we possess little knowledge about why voters in India do not prioritise demands for better quality education.

We argue that one of the reasons for low demand for education may well have to do with its *low attributability*. Delegation of responsibility and fragmentation of funding sources make it difficult for citizens to attribute education inputs to political action. As a result, citizens are reluctant to condition their electoral support on such inputs.¹ This can be true even when citizens can broadly distinguish between low and high quality education provision, which is often the case. The difficulty for citizens to attribute responsibility for education has ramifications for the effort governments decide to exert in improving the quality of education. Where responsibility is unclear, even when governments do work to improve such services citizens are more likely to attribute the outcome to chance, or to the complementary inputs, rather than to political effort; hence the government has little incentive to put in effort in the future given the low expectations of citizens (Mani and Mukand 2007; Harding and Stasavage 2014). In this study we use experimental methods in the context of New Delhi, India to examine (a) whether attribution is a problem that makes citizens less likely to raise demands for education and less likely to prefer or vote for candidates that promise improvements on education; and (b) whether information can improve attribution

¹This relates to the focus on visibility by Mani and Mukand (2007). Like them, we classify education as a less visible public service because education requires several inputs that may not depend on government competence alone and it is therefore harder for citizens to attribute education inputs to political actions.

and consequently raise citizens' demands for improvements to education.

To do so we use experimental methods to provide information to citizens on the specific role political actors have in providing education inputs, with the aim being to improve citizens' ability to attribute education inputs to political action. Citizen demands are crucial for effective democratic governance. If voters lack information to assess who is responsible for ensuring quality of public services, they cannot effectively make demands to improve service provision and hold politicians accountable for their provision. We provide information on attribution for responsibility for education inputs in government schools in Delhi and examine whether this leads voters to (a) correctly attribute responsibility for these inputs; (b) increase political demands for education inputs; and (c) political participation and interest; (d) prefer candidates that emphasise education inputs over candidates that emphasise other policies in their campaign promises. Finally, because we use a realistic partisan medium for the information treatment (a voice message recorded by an incumbent politician), we are also able to examine whether party affiliation conditions the impact of information on citizen choices. We also use the baseline (and control group) conjoint to analyse how the role of demographics such as, caste, gender, occupation, political backgrounds and political experience feature into voter choice.


2 Research design

The objective of the proposed research is to investigate whether attribution is a problem that makes citizens less likely to raise demands for education and less likely to prefer / vote for candidates that promise improvements on education. Attribution remains unexamined in the Indian context. Apart from general descriptives that suggest attribution may be a problem, specific data is lacking.

To fill this lacuna we first undertake a baseline survey of approx. 1000 respondents to collect data on quality of attribution amongst citizens in the urban capital of India, New Delhi. This will help us gauge the extent to which this problem is prevalent across voter demographics. We also embed a conjoint experiment in the baseline to examine respondents' preferences for political candidates that vary on type of public services they focus on such as education, healthcare, road repairs as well as vary on caste, gender, political experience and previous occupation. This is followed by a field experiment in collaboration with the Department of Education and Education Minister / Deputy Chief Minister in Delhi. In this field experiment we expose a subset of randomly selected respondents to information on attribution with regards to education policy and a follow up panel survey of the same 1000 respondents to examine whether the treatment influences both attribution and preferences towards education. Given the advantages of having three group comparisons as discussed extensively in [Gerber et al. \(2010\)](#), we design the trial as placebo controlled, that is some respondents also receive a placebo message as seen in [Figure 1](#). We provide more details below.

The first aim of this research is to assess to what extent Delhi voters can attribute policy outcomes to political action. This will be achieved with a survey instrument asking respondents to identify which actor (i.e., national or state politicians, or municipal government, or state bureau-

Figure 1: Experimental design



crats, street level bureaucrats, NGO, local community, etc.) they believe is primarily responsible for a range of education inputs in various government schools in Delhi such as, building classrooms, ensuring teacher trainings, providing student workshops and also across different policy outcomes including: building new roads, maintaining existing roads, providing clean water, deciding electricity fares and so on. These questions will be included in a baseline survey that will also collect data on participant's background.

The second aim is to investigate voters' preferences over various policy outcomes: education, health, water, road, etc. We will ask citizens which issues the government needs to focus most attention. We will also assess whether voters prefer candidates that make campaign promises that reflect various policies relative to other factors, such as, caste, wealth/ class background, gender etc. that have been highlighted in existing research, to shape political behaviour more broadly. This will be achieved with a conjoint survey experiment, which will be administered during the baseline survey.

The third aim is to assess whether the quality of attribution is affected by information about attribution, and whether being informed about attribution leads to changes in the demands citizens make for public goods, and their preferences for political candidates. After a week of washout period after the baseline survey, the attribution treatment will be administered in the form of a voice message about the provision of education inputs to be drafted in collaboration with Education Minister of Delhi, who will record the message in his own voice.

The attribution treatment message will first highlight the importance of a particular education input for improving the quality of education outcomes. Then it will inform participants that the provision of this input is the responsibility of their MLA. A simpler saliency treatment will only highlight the importance of the input for improving the quality of education outcomes, without informing who is responsible for its provision. The purpose of this saliency treatment is to enable separation of the effects of information about the attribution of the education input in question from

the potential effects of raising the salience of education. Our expectation is that being informed that the MLA is responsible for the education input will increase attribution, and that this in turn will increase demand, but it is possible that just hearing about education will increase its salience, thereby raising demand directly.

A control group will receive no voice message. It is not uncommon to receive recorded messages of this type in India. The participants will also receive a reinforcement in form of a Whatsapp or a text message which is a verbatim of the voice message. This experimental aspect of the survey will allow us to investigate the causal effect of providing information on attribution on the propensity of voters to demand education and on their political preferences. After another week of washout period following the treatment we will administer the end-line survey, including the questions about attribution and demands, and the conjoint experiment.

We plan to conduct a feasibility pilot in Delhi in September to improve the survey questions, examine attrition rates, and checking treatment delivery and compliance. The pilot is targeted at a sample size of 60-90 households and is a small sample size which does not give us enough power to analyse results. The full study is planned to be conducted from mid November to December in Delhi.

2.1 Why Delhi?

Delhi provides an ideal setting for this experiment for four key reasons. First, Delhi is a rich Indian state with high per capita income (three times the national average). Literacy rates are high for both men and women (over 90%), and voters are highly engaged in the democratic process, as evident in high voter turnout, and citizen's massive participation in recent anti-corruption movements in 2011-12. Such an urbanised context, provides the most likely setting where voters can correctly attribute responsibility, yet the quality of attribution is low and demand for improvements in education is non-existent as demonstrated consistently in multiple election studies. Second, the situation of public schools in Delhi is poor. This has been again documented across several recent surveys. Third, to specifically address the cause of public schooling, the current Delhi government (2015-) has increased spending on education (highest in India) year on year since 2015 and focused strongly on improving quality of public schools that are lagging behind. The government has taken concrete political actions to improve quality of education. This provides us an interesting context where we can inform voters about the provision of education inputs.

2.2 Sampling strategy

The project combines surveys and experiments in 80 (tentative) polling booths located within municipal wards across 6-7 assembly constituency in Delhi. We first purposely selected 6-7 low-middle income constituency of Delhi. We choose these constituency keeping in mind that it should have a planned colony as well as a slum area to allow for socio-economic diversity as well as ease to participant access for a two wave survey. We consider two municipal wards within the constituency to ensure some minimal levels of cultural, political and socio-economic diversity in our sample. In

each of these the municipal wards, 25-30 polling booths will be randomly selected and citizens will be selected using systematic random sampling.

3 Ethical review

This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee (Reference number: R58325/RE001).

4 Empirical approach

For outcomes that we measure through the conjoint, formally, consider a random sample of $N = 1000$ respondents drawn from a population of interest. Each respondent (indexed by $i \in [1, 2, 3 \dots N]$) is presented with $K = 5$ choice (or rating) tasks ($K = 6$ in the end line survey), and in each of her tasks the respondent chooses the preferred (or rates each) of the $J = 2$ alternatives. We refer to the choice alternatives as profiles. In our experiment a profile consists of one specific MLA candidate. Each profile is characterised by a set of $L = 5$ discretely valued attributes, or a treatment composed of L components. We use D_l to denote the total number of levels for attribute. We denote the treatment given to respondent i as the j^{th} profile in her k^{th} choice task by a vector T_{ijk} , whose l^{th} component T_{ijk}^l corresponds to the l^{th} attribute of the profile. This L -dimensional vector T_{ijk} can take any value in set T , which is 336 in this case, that is there are 336 unique profiles. For choice outcomes, by design respondents must choose one preferred profile j within each choice task k , that is, $\sum_{j=1}^J Y_{ijk} = 1$. The conjoint design allows us to compare not only the effects of different values within policy promises but also the effects across other attributes, allowing us to make statements about the relative weight voters place on various criteria.

We first focus here on the forced choice outcomes and the linear regression estimators with standard errors clustered by respondent. We use a simple linear regression estimator and regress the binary choice variable on dummy variables for each attribute level (excluding the baseline levels). Here, the AMCE is interpreted as the average change in the probability that a profile will win support when it includes the listed attribute value instead of the baseline attribute value. We obtain the AMCEs for all attributes simultaneously by running a single regression of the choice outcome on the sets of dummy variables for the attribute values. For the attributes that do not involve restrictions we simply include the set of dummy variables for all attribute values (excluding the baseline category). The ACME for going from the reference category t_0 to the comparison category t_1 is then given by the coefficient estimates on the respective dummy variable. In Q2 we ask the respondent to rate each of the candidate.

To estimate the AMCEs for attributes that involve restrictions such as the candidate's profession which for two cases co-occurs with particular gender, we include indicator variables for all but one value of profession and gender as well as their pairwise interactions. To estimate the AMCE for profession, we estimate its effect separately in each stratum of the linked attribute (profession)

using the coefficients from the interacted regression. We then average across those estimates.

We estimate the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of levels for both the pre and post treatment conjoint and take the difference between AMCEs for the education policy attribute as the average treatment effect. We also calculate the salience treatment effect in the same way. The ATE is given as, $ATE = E[\theta_3|D = 1] - E[\theta_3|D = 0]$. For outcomes that we measure through the survey questions, the ATE is the difference in the average rank of education in each question between treatment and control group.

5 Power analysis

The proposed study is an experiment with 3 groups: control, attribution treatment and salience treatment. Each of the three groups contain voters from over X number of polling booths within a single constituency. This means there are 333 individuals in each group. For our binary predictors, we seek to assess whether we can detect an effect of 0.1 in the proportion voters that demand education from 0.1 to 0.25. In order to generate the industry standard of 80% power with 95% confidence intervals we arrive at a minimum sample size of 393. To go from 0.1 to 0.25 we require 196 respondents which is less than 333.

6 Conjoint design

I will show you profiles of two hypothetical MLA candidates for the next Delhi state elections from your constituency. You have to carefully read the whole profile and choose one candidate you would vote for.

1. **Name** is a potential candidate from your constituency.
2. **He/She** belongs to the AAP — BJP — INC — no partisan information is displayed.
3. **He/She** was a senior advocate — government primary school teacher — newspaper journalist — housewife (only with female) — farmer (only with male) *before entering into politics*.
4. **He/She** has no political experience prior to this. — has been an MLA earlier. — has been an MCD councillor earlier. — has been the state party president earlier. — has been the president of the local RWA (resident welfare association / community association earlier).
5. No one from **his/her** family was ever into politics. — **His/Her** father was an MP. — **His/Her** father was an MCD councillor. — **His/Her** father was an MLA. — **His/Her** father was the state party president.
6. (a) **His/Her** campaign has focussed on making sure that Delhi becomes a world class smart city. **He/She** will ensure that these upgrades also take place *in his/her constituency*.

Table 1: Conjoint Attributes

Attribute	Levels
Gender	G1: Male
	G2: Female
Party	P1: AAP
	P2: INC
	P3: BJP
	P4: No partisan information appears
Caste	C1: Lower caste
	C2: Upper Caste
	C3: Muslim
Policy	P1: no particular policy promise
	P2: education
	P3: water shortage
	P4: roads repair
	P5: health care
Occupation	O1: senior advocate
	O2: government primary school teacher
	O3: newspaper journalist
	O4: property dealer and small time contractor
	O5a: housewife (occur only with female)
	O5b: farmer (occur only with male)
Political Experience	E1: no political experience prior to this.
	E2: has been an MLA.
	E4: has been an MCD councillor.
	E3: has been the state party president.
Political Backgrounds	E4: has been the president of the local RWA (resident welfare association/ community association).
	PB1: No one from his/her family was ever into politics.
	PB2 : [His/Her] father was an MP.
	PB3 : [His/Her] father was an MCD councillor.
	PB4 : [His/Her] father was an MLA.
PB5: [His/Her] father was the state party president.	

Notes: (a) Caste and gender are signalled through names. For males the upper caste names are - Naresh Gupta, Gopal Tyagi, Ajay Tripathi and lower caste names are - Rajesh Paswan, Manoj Jatav, Raju Chauhan. For females the upper caste names are - Pooja Gupta, Nupur Tyagi, Neelam Tripathi and lower caste names are - Kavita Paswan, Aarti Jatav, Rani Kumari. For males - Muslim names are - Asif Khan, Mohd. Arif, Iqbal Ansari. For females - Muslim names are - Shabana Mahmood, Noor Khan, Fatima Ansari. (b) Because housewife is impossible for men it will always occur with female names. Same goes for farmer which is less realistic for female and therefore only occurs with male.

- (b) **His/Her** campaign has focussed on improving the quality of education. **He/She** will participate in school management and ensure that there is no teacher shortage in the government schools *in his/her constituency*.
- (c) **His/Her** campaign has focussed on improving the supply of water. **He/ She** will ensure that there is 24-7 water supply to every home *in his/her constituency*.
- (d) **His/Her** campaign has focussed on improving the quality of roads. **He/ She** will ensure provision of new roads and the repair of bad roads *in his/her constituency*.
- (e) **His/Her** campaign has focussed on improving the quality of healthcare. **He/ She** will ensure that people do not face delays in accessing government hospitals *in his/her constituency*.

In each conjoint task, respondents will be asked the following questions:

Q1: With only the given information, which MLA candidate would you vote for?

Q2: On a scale of 0 to 10, for each of the candidate please give a rating of how likely you are to vote for each candidate with 0 meaning never/not at all likely and 10 meaning will definitely vote? Record c1/c2.

7 Baseline survey design

S1: Consent

Q1: Share information about the study and then ask for consent. Do you give me your consent to participate in the study? (a) Yes (b) No. (if No, enumerator thanks and leaves).

S2: Starting questions

Q1: Are you above or at 18 years? (a) Yes (b) No (if No enumerator thanks and leaves, if Yes continue).

Q2: Do you have a Delhi voter ID card? (a) Yes (b) No (if Yes go to question 3, if no go to question 4).

Q3: Do you have a voter ID card for any other state? (a) Yes (b) No (if Yes enumerator thanks and leaves, if No continue).

Q4: Do you use a mobile phone? (a) Yes (b) No (if No enumerator thanks and leaves, if Yes continue).

Q5: Is this your own mobile phone? (a) Yes (b) No.

Q6: Can you share this mobile number with me? (a) Yes (b) No (*If hesistant, reassure, end if no.*)

Q7: Do you use text messaging? (a) Yes (b) No.

Q8: Do you use whatsapp? (a) Yes (b) No.

Q9: If yes to having whatsapp, is your whatsapp same as above number. (a) Yes (b) No. If no, record whatsapp number.

Q10: Do you have do not disturb on your phone? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Not sure.

S3: Demographics

Q1: What is your name? Record name.

Q2: Gender (a) Male (b) Female (c) Other.

Q3: Record address.

Q4: What day(s) are you most likely to be available at this address for an interview? Tick as many possible for respondent. (a) Mon (b) Tue (c) Wed (d) Thur (e) Fri (f) Sat (g) Sun (h) All days.

- Q5:** What time(s) do you most prefer to be interviewed during the day (1 hour slot)? Tick as many possible for respondent. (a) 9am (b)10am (c)11am (d)12noon (e) 1pm (f) 2pm (g) 3pm (h) 4pm (i) 5pm (j) 6pm (k) 7pm (l) 8pm
- Q6:** Were you born in Delhi? (a) Yes (b) No (if No ask next 2 questions)
- Q7:** For how many years have you lived in Delhi? (a) 0-5 years (b) 6-10 years (c) 11-20 years (d) 21-30 years (e) Over 30 years.
- Q8:** Which is your birth state? Record (provide drop down of state list on ipad).
- Q9:** What is your age?
- Q10:** What is your marital status? (a) Married (b) Never married (c) Widowed / Divorced / Separated (d) refused.
- Q11:** Up to what level have you studied? (a) Not literate (b) Below primary (c) Up to 8th (completed primary) (d) Up to 10th (completed Matric) (e) Completed school (f) Bachelors degree (g) Master's degree or diploma and above (h) refused
- Q12:** What is your employment status? (a) employed (b) retired (c) housewife/husband (d) student (e) unemployed (f) refused (if (a) ask next question)
- Q13:** What is your occupation? (Record occupation using list)
- Q14:** Are you the highest earner of your household? (yes, no, refused). If yes record yes; If no, what is the main occupation of the highest earner? Record occupation of the highest earner (record occupation using list).
- Q15:** What is your caste/ jati? Record using list.
- Q16:** What is your caste group? (a) SC (b) ST (c) OBC (d) General (e) DK (f) refused.
- Q17:** What is your religion? (a) Hindu (b) Muslim (c) Sikh (c) Christian (d) Jain (e) Buddhist (f) No religion (g) Others (h) DK (i) refused.
- Q18:** Do you speak English? (a) Yes (b) No. If yes, how fluent are you (a) Proficient/ Very good (b) Average (c) Weak (d) DK (e) refused.
- Q19:** Does your household have following? (a) Car (b) Bicycle (c) Scooter/ Moped (d) Motorcycle (d) Air conditioner (e) Washing Machine (f) Computer/ Laptop (g) Wifi/ internet (h) Sofa (i) Fridge (j) Water purifier/RO (k) Television (l) DK (m) Refused(Display as checkbox and tick as many that apply).
- Q20:** Total number of family members in the house (including children, and people who eat from the same kitchen)? DK/refused
- Q21:** Total in-hand monthly income of the main earner? (record exact answer). DK/refused
- Q22:** Record type of house (a) Pakka Flat/ House (b) Slum/ Jhuggi (c) Kaccha ghar (d) Other record (e) DK (f) refused
- Q23:** How often do you read the newspaper? (a) Never (b) Daily (c) 3-4 times a week (d) Once a week (e) Occasionally (f) Rarely (g) DK (h) refused

- Q24:** How often do you use facebook? (a) Never (b) Daily (c) 3-4 times a week (d) Once a week (e) Occasionally (f) Rarely (g) DK (h) refused
- Q25:** How often do you watch news on television? (a) Never (b) Daily (c) 3-4 times a week (d) Once a week (e) Occasionally (f) Rarely (g) DK (h) refused
- Q26:** How interested are you in politics? (On a scale of 0-10 with 10 - Highly interested and 0 - not at all interested) DK/refused.

S4: Conjoint is played.

S5: State of public services in Delhi

Now I will ask you some questions about public services in Delhi. By public service I mean the services that the government provides to all its citizens.

- Q1:** What are the top three public services that you would like the government to provide? (open question) (998 for DK, 999 for refused/no answer)
- Q2:** What are the top three public services that you think need the most improvement in your constituency? (open question) (998 for DK, 999 for refused/no answer)
- Q3:** Out of the list of these public services - what are the top 3 public services you would like the government to focus on? (a) roads repairs (b) health care access in government hospitals (c) water shortage (d) quality of education in government schools (f) clean streets (g) sanitation and sewage (h) regularise unauthorised colonies (i) other (j) none of the above.
- Q4:** How much more do you think the Delhi state government needs to provide of these services (10- government is providing a lot, 0- government is not providing anything) (rating question)?
- i. Building new roads and road repairs.
 - ii. Improving the quality of education in government schools.
 - iii. Improving government schools infrastructure such as building libraries, computer labs, new classrooms.
 - iv. Ensuring regular availability of water.
 - v. Sanitation and sewage disposal.
 - vi. Healthcare quality and quick access to services in government hospitals.
- Q5:** How would you rate the quality of each of these services in Delhi (On a scale of 0- 10 - with 10 being extremely good and 0-extremely bad) (rating question)?
- i. Roads.
 - ii. Government schools infrastructure such as building libraries, computer labs, new classrooms.
 - iii. Quality of education in government schools.

- iv. Water supply.
- v. Sanitation and sewage disposal.
- vi. Healthcare quality and quick access to services in government hospitals.

S6: Attribution and awareness

Now we will play a small quiz on governance in Delhi.

Q1: When were the last Vidhan Sabha elections held in Delhi? (a) Correctly answered (b) Incorrectly answered (enumerator to remember that correct answer is 2015.)

Q2: Who are the top three actors responsible for ensuring good quality of education in government secondary schools in Delhi? (a) (b) (c) (open ended - record exact answer.)

Q3: For the following questions please choose from one the following only with respect to Delhi- (a) MP/central govt. (b) MLA/ state govt. (c) MCD councillor/ MCD (d) NGO/- Community groups (e) Do not know (for school questions option of School Management Committees is also present)

- i. Who is responsible for overseeing law and order and managing the Delhi police? Record answer. (correct answer : central govt.)
- ii. Who is responsible for maintaining clean streets and garbage disposal? Record answer. (correct answer : MCD)
- iii. Who is responsible for building roads in Delhi? Record answer. (correct answer : state govt.)
- iv. Who is responsible for collecting property tax in Delhi? Record answer. (correct answer : MCD councillor)
- v. Who is responsible for responsible for constructing and maintaining government secondary school buildings? Record answer. (correct answer : state govt.)
- vi. Who is responsible for learning outcomes of students in government secondary schools? Record answer. (correct answer : state govt.)
- vii. Who is responsible for monitoring school funds allocated to government secondary schools? Record answer. (correct answer : state govt.)
- viii. Who is responsible for overseeing the management of government secondary schools? Record answer. (correct answer : state govt.)
- ix. Who is responsible for providing adequate teacher training in most of the government secondary schools? Record answer. (correct answer : state govt.)

Q4: Do you know about school management committees? (a) Yes (b) No. If yes, who are its members? Tick all that the respondent mentions from the following (a) parents (b) community / civil activists (c) teachers/ school principal (d) MLA (e) Other - Enumerator records the exact response if the response is not any of the options.

S7: Political preferences, exposure and behaviour

Now I will ask you some questions about your political preferences as a Delhi citizen.

- Q1:** Did you vote in Delhi state assembly / Vidhan Sabha elections in 2015? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don't remember/ Can't answer.
- Q2:** If yes, who did you vote for? (ensuring secrecy on ipad) (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) BSP (e) Other (put logos of the party) (f) refused.
- Q3:** Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular political party? (a) Yes (b) No. If Yes, which party is that? (ensuring secrecy on ipad) (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) BSP (e) Other (put image logos of the party) (f) refused.
- Q4:** For each of the following party how close do you feel to them? (0-10) (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (On a scale of 0-10, 10 - is very close and 0 - not at all) (put image logos of the party).
- Q5:** For each of these services/ issues do you associate any party with them? If yes, which of the three (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) no particular party? Re-iterate you can also say no party.
- i. Pro-poor policies (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party.
 - ii. Mohalla clinics (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party.
 - iii. Building Delhi bus corridor/ BRT (bus rapid transit) (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party (e) some other party.
 - iv. Building new roads and doing road repairs (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party (e) some other party.
 - v. Building the Delhi metro (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party (e) some other party.
 - vi. Focussing on education quality in government schools (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party (e) some other party.
 - vii. Focussing on management of government schools (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party (e) some other party.
 - viii. Lowering electricity prices (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party (e) some other party.
 - ix. Providing free water (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party (e) some other party.
 - x. Building classrooms and libraries in government schools (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) No particular party (d) Other party (e) some other party.
- Q6:** When deciding how to vote in state elections how important to you is (a) The party (b) The MLA candidate (Rating scale 0-10, 0 not at all important, 10 extremely important, dk, wouldn't vote).
- Q7:** What do you think are the top three responsibilities of your area MLA? (open ended) (a) (b) (c) (Record exact, 998 for DK, 999 for refused).

- Q8:** What is the name of your area MLA? Populate name-constituency pairs for constituency being surveyed for enumerator. (a) Correctly answered (b) Incorrectly answered.
- Q9:** Which party is your MLA from? (a) AAP (b) BJP (c) INC (d) Other (e) Don't remember.
- Q10:** Do you know about MLA local area development (MLALAD) funds? (a) Yes (b) No. If yes, a) can you tell me top two things that they can be used for? (a) (b) (Record exact).
- Q11:** Who is the education minister of Delhi? (a) Correctly answered (b) Incorrectly answered (c) DK (enumerator remembers correct answer - Manish Sisodia).
- Q12:** Which party is he/she from? (a) Correctly answered (b) Incorrectly answered (c) DK (enumerator remembers correct answer - AAP).

S8: Questions for parents with school going children

only show if respondent indicated marriage/ widow/divorced/separated previously

Now I have some questions for you if you have school going children.

- Q1:** Do you have children? (a) Yes (b) No. (c) refused. If yes, then complete this section. If No, move to the final section.
- Q2:** How many children do you have? Record exact number/refused.
- Q3:** Do your children go to school? (a) Yes (b) No (c) refused. If no, move to next section.
- Q4:** If yes to children goes to school - Which standard (record for each of the first three oldest children)? Record exact class.
- Q5:** If yes to children goes to school - Which type of school (a) private (b) government school (c) other (record exact if other).
- Q6:** If yes to children goes to school - Does the school organise PTA meetings? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Not aware (for every school).
- Q7:** If yes to children goes to school - Have you ever participated in PTA meetings? (a) Yes (b) No
- Q8:** If yes to children goes to school - Does the school have a school management committee? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Not aware. (for every school)
- Q9:** If yes to previous question - Have you ever participated in SMC meetings? (a) Yes, frequently (b) Yes, sometimes (c) Never (d) I am a member.
- Q10:** If yes to children goes to school - How would you rate the overall quality of education in your child's school? (on a scale of 0-10, 10 is extremely good and 0- extremely bad).
- Q11:** If yes to children goes to school - If given a choice which school would you like to send your child to? (a) government school (b) private school (c) other - record answer.

Q12: You indicated that one of the schools you send your child/children to has a School management committee. I am going to ask you some general questions about the SMC in the schools.

- i. Can you describe any one main responsibility of the SMC? ? text box entry
- ii. How effective do you think are SMCs in improving quality of education? Rating scale - 0 to 10 - 0 ? Not at all effective , 10 ? Extremely effective, DK.
- iii. Would you like to participate in your school?s SMC in future? ? a) Yes b) No c) I am not sure.

S9: Questions specific to education quality in Delhi

Now I will ask you some general questions about education quality in government secondary schools, that is, schools with 9th class and above, in Delhi.

Q1: How would you rate the overall quality of education in secondary government schools? (on a scale of 0-10, 10 is extremely good and 0- extremely bad, DK/refused).

Q2: How would you rate the overall quality of education in secondary private schools? (on a scale of 0-10, 10 is extremely good and 0- extremely bad, DK/refused).

Q3: Do you think the state government pays enough attention to improving quality of education in secondary government schools? (on a scale of 0-10 - 10 pays great deal of attention and 0- pays no attention at all, DK/refused)

Q4: Do you think the state government has the capacity to improve quality of education in secondary government schools if it wants to? (on a scale of 0-10- 10 it surely can and 0 - it will not be able to, DK/refused)

Q5: Should state government continue to provide education through government schools, or should education only be provided through private schools? (a) only government (b) only private (c) both should be available (d) DK

S10: Confirm receipt of 100 INR. (a) Yes I have received the INR 100. I am aware I will receive this again on completing another round. (b) Money is returned.

8 Endline survey design

S1: Conjoint is played.

S2: State of public services in Delhi

S3: Attribution and awareness

S4: Political preferences, exposure and behaviour

S5: Questions specific to education quality in Delhi

S6: Caste and jobs battery (only for pilot)

Q1: Now I will ask you some general questions about caste and names that you heard while looking at the candidate profiles. For each of the name, please tell me two things. That is, if you think the name is Hindu or Muslim and if the name is upper or lower caste. *Each respondent sees randomly appearing 4 names out of the conjoint list with each name having two queries as below.*

i. Name 1

(a) Hindu (b) Muslim (c) Cannot say

(a) Lower caste (b) Upper Caste (c) Cannot say

ii. Name 2

(a) Hindu (b) Muslim (c) Cannot say

(a) Lower caste (b) Upper Caste (c) Cannot say

iii. Name 3

(a) Hindu (b) Muslim (c) Cannot say

(a) Lower caste (b) Upper Caste (c) Cannot say

iv. Name 4

(a) Hindu (b) Muslim (c) Cannot say

(a) Lower caste (b) Upper Caste (c) Cannot say

Q2: For each of the following jobs, please tell me what income bracket you associate them with?

i. Government primary school teacher (a) poor (b) lower middle (b) middle (c) upper middle (d) rich

ii. Newspaper journalist (a) poor (b) lower middle (b) middle (c) upper middle (d) rich

iii. Senior advocate (a) poor (b) lower middle (b) middle (c) upper middle (d) rich

iv. Property dealer / small time contractor (a) poor (b) lower middle (b) middle (c) upper middle (d) rich

v. Working with NGO (a) poor (b) lower middle (b) middle (c) upper middle (d) rich

vi. Farmer (a) poor (b) lower middle (b) middle (c) upper middle (d) rich

Q3: Which of these jobs are high prestige? (check box with options Government primary school teacher, newspaper journalist, senior advocate, property dealer and small time contractor, working with NGO, farmer)

Q4: Which of these jobs are low prestige? (check box with options Government primary school teacher, newspaper journalist, senior advocate, property dealer and small time contractor, working with NGO, farmer)

Q5: You would have received an automated voice message in the voice of Manish Sisodia.

i. Do you think the message provided you correct information? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Not sure.

- ii. Do you think that the message was neutral/ unbiased? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Not sure.
- iii. Did you think the message was connected with this study? (a) Yes (b) No.

S7: Confirm receipt of 100 INR. (a) Yes I have received the INR 100.

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