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Metaketa I: Information and Accountability

Information, Accountability, and Cumulative Learning: Lessons from Metaketa I 
Thad Dunning, Guy Grossman, Macartan Humphreys, Susan Hyde, Craig McIntosh, and Gareth Nellis (Eds.)
Cambridge University Press (2019)

Voter Information Campaigns and Political Accountability: Cumulative Findings From a Preregistered Meta-Analysis of Coordinated Trials
Thad Dunning, et al. 
Science Advances (03 Jul 2019): Vol. 5, no. 7

EGAP Policy Brief 59: Metaketa I: Information and Accountability


Reducing or Reinforcing In-Group Preferences? An Experiment on Information and Ethnic Voting
Claire Adida, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon
Quarterly Journal of Political Science (2017): Vol. 12: No. 4, pp 437-477. 

Breaking the Clientelistic Voting Equilibrium: The Joint Importance of Salience and Coordination
Claire Adida, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon
Comparative Political Studies. Conditionally accepted. 
AidData Working Paper #48. 

Response Bias in Survey Measures of Voter Behavior: Implications for Measurement and Inference
Claire Adida, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon
Journal of Experimental Political Science. (2019) 1-7. 

EGAP Policy Brief 44: Examining Ethnicity-Based Voting Under High & Low Information Settings in Benin


Electoral Incentives to Combat Mosquito-Borne Illnesses: Experimental Evidence from Brazil
Taylor C. Boas and F. Daniel Hidalgo
World Development (2019): Vol. 113: pp 89-99.

Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil
Taylor C. Boas, F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Marcus André Melo
American Journal of Political Science 63, 2 (April 2019): 385-400. 

Accountability Backlash: Negative Electoral Responses to Public Service Provision in Brazil
Taylor C. Boas, F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Guillermo Toral
Under review.

EGAP Policy Brief 45: The Effect of Informing Voters About Incumbent Malfeasance in Brazil


Information Provision, Voter Coordination, and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Mexican Social Networks
Eric Arias, Pablo  E. Balán, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín.
American Political Science Review 113(2): 475-498. 

Priors Rule: When Do Malfeasance Revelations Help or Hurt Incumbent Parties?
Eric Arias, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín
Under review.

Does the Content and Mode of Delivery of Information Matter for Political Accountability? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Mexico
Eric Arias, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín
Working paper. 

EGAP Policy Brief 54: Evidence from Mexico: The Effect of Incumbent Malfeasance Revelations

Uganda 1

Meet the Candidates: Information and Accountability in Primaries and General Elections
Melina Platas and Pia Raffler
Working paper. 

EGAP Policy Brief 50: The Effect of Information on Vote Choice and Turnout in Uganda

Uganda 2

SMS Texts on Corruption Help Ugandan Voters Hold Elected Councillors Accountable At The Polls
Mark Buntaine, Ryan Jablonski, Daniel L. Nielson, and Paula M. Pickering 
PNAS June 26, 2018 115 (26) 6668-6673