

Pre-Analysis Plan: Citizen-State Relations in Informal Settlements in Lagos, Nigeria

Motivation

Lagos, Nigeria, like other megacities across the globe serves as a symbol of promise and opportunity for those who call the city home. While the Nigerian government shares similar goals of growth for the city, in practice, development is uneven and leaves many of the city's inhabitants behind. As the Lagos State government seeks to transform the country's largest city into the next Dubai¹, it is faced with the question of how to develop its shopping malls and luxury apartment complexes while still upholding the social contract even with its poorest residents. Although there are some initiatives focused on inclusive development, the government has often adopted a strategy of simply trying to remove informal street hawkers and residents of informal settlements, through arrests, evictions, and demolitions.² As a result, some residents of informal settlements fear being forcefully evicted from their homes by the government or overnight demolition of their entire community.³

From an outsider's perspective, it would appear that the state has broken its social contract with these citizens. When services no longer function and the state is seen as the predator, rather than protector, how do citizens view the government and make decisions about engaging with it? The goal of this pilot study is to explore the relationship between residents of informal settlements in this megacity and the government. We study these questions in Lagos because it serves as the nexus of tensions between the state's implementation of its goals and citizens' interests. And because its promise of opportunity is also a draw for migrants, Lagos is characterized by religious and ethnic diversity.

This study investigates how exposure to forced evictions correlates with mistrust of the state, investment in livelihoods, and political and community engagement. When residents are uncertain of what tomorrow might hold for them, how do they make economic investment decisions and choices about participating in political activities? How do they decide whether to engage and collaborate with their neighbors? Since state provision of social services is sparse in these settlements, community members may need to cooperate to self-provide. We examine intra-community dynamics and explore how individuals relate to and rely on other members of their community for both economic and social benefits. We also explore citizens' relationships with local leaders, including traditional chiefs (baales), community development association

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<https://qz.com/africa/936761/lagos-wants-to-be-a-modern-mega-city-so-its-forcing-thousands-of-slum-dwellers-from-their-homes/>

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<https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/The-Human-Cost-of-a-Megacity-Nigeria-forced-evictions-report.pdf>

3

<https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/special-report-ambode-killed-members-of-our-community-otodo-gbame-residents-mourn-id6399718.html>

(CDA) officials. These leaders likely play important roles as intermediaries with the state and community organizers. We are also interested in the role of traditional landowning elites, who are often politically powerful and may themselves either protect or predate on communities.

This pre-analysis plan was written after data collection but before researchers analyzed the data. What follows describes how the data were collected and our proposed tests to explore the themes and research questions described above. The purpose of this study is to test these initial hypotheses as well as to generate additional questions for research in future qualitative and quantitative work.

Research Design

A team of eight research assistants administered 502 surveys in 42 informal settlement areas/communities between July 13 and August 8, 2018. Communities were sampled from a list provided by our in-country practitioner partners, Justice and Empowerment Initiatives (JEI) and the Nigerian Slum/Informal Settlement Federation (the Federation). The list included communities that had been “profiled” (a community-led data collection process that involves structure tallying, boundary mapping, and a focus-group about the communities history and development priorities), and those that had at least one savings group through the Federation (which potentially may have had little contact with JEI). JEI and the Federation do outreach in communities that they identify as informal – this identification largely happens via word of mouth through their network of volunteers – which may result in the establishment of savings groups, profiling, or both. Although they do not have strict criteria for the communities in which they work, they prioritize those where they perceive the greatest need. For example, many of the communities are waterfront settlements, which are more vulnerable to eviction. Most of the communities are in severe need of government services and infrastructure. In other words, although all of the communities have had some contact with the work of the partner organizations, there is significant variation in their level of involvement. Several staff members of the partners looked over the listing and excluded any communities for which access or safety would potentially be an issue. Of the list of 115 communities in Lagos, 28 were eliminated due to access. Two communities were removed for being too formal, six for being demolished and no longer in existence, and two for being sites of preliminary qualitative interviews. Research assistants noted that some communities were more formal than others, and we recorded these impressions. During the survey period, one community was removed from the sample for potential security issues, five were removed for being too small, and four for being sub-communities or repeats of places already surveyed. The final sample includes communities from 13 of the 20 local government areas (LGAs).

In most communities, we sampled 12 respondents using a random-walk technique. A team of four RAs went to the four farthest corners of the community, based on the boundaries identified by a local leader. The RAs decided on a particular household count rule depending on the size

of the community.⁴ Starting from the boundary points, they stopped at every n^{th} structure. If multiple households occupied the same structure, a household was randomly chosen using the date. RAs alternated between selecting male and female respondents to ensure gender balance.⁵

Hypotheses

Preferences over policy (P)

1. Do residents prefer (would be happier with) government-led upgrading or community-led upgrading? Do residents believe that government-led upgrading or community-led upgrading will take longer to complete?
2. Are residents more willing to cooperate with government-led upgrading or community-led upgrading?
3. Do residents have a greater preference for third party involvement (NGO, private developer) for government-led upgrading or community-led upgrading? Which third parties do they most prefer?
4. Are residents willing to contribute money or labor to community-led upgrading?
5. Do residents believe the government would fulfill the community's requests in a community-led upgrading?
6. Do residents believe housing units would be accessible (affordable) for their community in a government-led upgrading?
7. Where would residents relocate if they were evicted?
8. Would residents prefer compensation or a resettlement plan if they had to be evicted?
9. Would residents prefer an upgraded house or more income?
10. Would residents be more willing to contribute labor or money to community development?

Heterogeneous effects: Landlords and tenants, Past eviction experience

Controls: gender, age, tribe, religion, education level, poverty index (measured as frequency without food/water/cash income), membership in a savings group, and political affiliation.

Empirical strategy: P1-P3 will be tested using linear regression. First, the bivariate relationship between the outcome will be tested with a single regressor, which upgrading option the respondent was shown (community-led or government-led). Then the controls will also be added. We will also look at heterogeneous effects. All regressions will include community and enumerator fixed effects.

⁴ The household rule used ranged from every 1 to 10 households. On average, the team selected every 4th household.

⁵ If there were multiple potential respondents in the selected household (e.g., three women from the household were home who were 18 years or above) the person with the closest birthday to the current date was selected for interview.

P4-P10 will first be tested simply using frequency tables. We will also look at subgroup differences (see heterogeneous effects) with controls.

Uncertainty (U)

1. Uncertainty and Government Interactions

a. Trust

- i. Are citizens who experienced forced eviction/demolition in the past (either directly/personally or others in their community) less likely to trust the government?
- ii. Are citizens who expect or fear eviction by the state in the future less likely to trust the government?

b. Accountability

- i. Are citizens who experienced forced eviction/demolition in the past (either directly/personally or others in their community) or think eviction by the state is possible in the future less likely to take action to hold the government accountable?
- ii. Are citizens who expect or fear eviction by the state in the future less likely to take action to hold the government accountable?

c. Voting:

- i. Are citizens who experienced forced eviction/demolition in the past (either directly/personally or others in their community) more or less likely to vote?
- ii. Are citizens who expect or fear eviction by the state in the future more or less likely to vote?

d. Compliance

- i. Are citizens who experienced forced eviction/demolition in the past (either directly/personally or others in their community) less likely to comply with the government?
- ii. Are citizens who expect or fear eviction by the state in the future less likely to comply with the government?
- iii. Are citizens who rely more heavily on their local community less likely to comply with the government when it puts community members at risk (e.g., reporting crime to the police)?

2. Uncertainty and Community Engagement

a. Trust

- i. Are citizens who experienced forced eviction/demolition in the past (either directly/personally or others in their community) less likely to trust other community members? Are they less likely to trust community leaders?
- ii. Are citizens who expect or fear eviction by the state in the future less likely to trust other community members? Are they less likely to trust community leaders?

1. Are community members' expectations and fears about eviction consistent with leaders' assessments of whether a community is under threat of eviction?
- b. Community Development
 - i. Are citizens who experienced forced eviction/demolition in the past (either directly/personally or others in their community) less likely to contribute to community development?
 - ii. Are citizens who expect or fear eviction by the state in the future less likely to contribute to community development?
3. Uncertainty and Investment
 - a. Are citizens who experienced forced eviction/demolition in the past (either directly/personally or others in their community) less likely to improve or invest in their property?
 - b. Are citizens who expect or fear eviction by the state in the future less likely to improve or invest in their property?
4. Uncertainty and fear
 - a. Does greater perceived probability of eviction translate into greater fear of eviction?
 - b. Does perceived probability of eviction or fear of eviction better predict any differences in outcomes?

Heterogeneous effects: Gender, Landlord/tenant, Savings group membership (as an indicator of contact with an NGO)

Controls: gender, age, tribe, religion, education level, poverty index (measured as frequency without food/water/cash income), landlord/tenant, and political affiliation.

Empirical strategy: All of the above hypotheses will be tested using linear regression. First, the bivariate relationship will be tested with a single regressor. Then the controls will also be added. We will also look at heterogeneous effects. All regressions will include community and enumerator fixed effects.

We also randomized whether respondents were asked about past eviction experience and perceived future likelihood of eviction before or after a subset of questions about respondents' relationship with the government and their community. For this survey experiment, treatment is defined as being asked the eviction questions before the outcomes of interest. This will be a test of whether the salience of eviction has any relationship with respondents' stated attitudes and intentions. Some regressions will include an indicator for treatment and an interaction term between the treatment and the respondents perceived future likelihood or fear of eviction.

Supplementary test: Respondents who were tenants were asked about their expectation of eviction by their landlord. For this subset of respondents, we will do a test of political outcomes on this variable. We will look at the difference between the expectations of eviction by these different actors. We expect that evictions by the state would have a greater effect on political outcomes.

Correlates of feeling more/less secure (C)

1. Do citizens who pay higher rent compared to their neighbors feel more secure from eviction by their landlords?
2. Do citizens who pay more in taxes feel more secure from eviction by the government?
3. Do citizens who pay taxes *and* receive a receipt for their payment feel more secure from eviction by the government?
4. Do citizens who make payments to landowners feel more secure from eviction by the government (particularly chieftaincy families, potentially a powerful third party who can enforce informal rights)?
5. How do feelings of security/insecurity vary depending on who owns the land?
6. How do feelings of security/insecurity vary by religion and membership in religious groups?
7. How do feeling of security/insecurity vary by indigeneity?

Social relations and social norms (S)

1. Are residents of more homogeneous communities (in terms of religion and tribe) more willing to contribute to public goods?
 - a. If there is a relationship between homogeneity and willingness to contribute to public goods, is this conditional on how long residents have lived in that community or in Lagos? Is this relationship conditional on how long the community has existed?
2. Are individuals who are more socially dependent (Rosenzweig 2018) -- rely more heavily on other community members -- more likely to believe that voting is rewarded/respected by other community members?
3. Are respondents in communities that more heavily rely on government services (subjective assessment) more likely to think that paying taxes benefits the community?
4. Are respondents in communities that more heavily rely on government services (subjective assessment) more likely to think that voting benefits the community?
5. Are respondents that have experienced (directly or indirectly) forced evictions more likely to think that participating in protest benefits the community?
6. Are respondents that have experienced (directly or indirectly) forced evictions more likely to rely more heavily (subjective assessment) on other community members?
7. Are individuals who name three closest friends that share their same tribe/religion more likely to vote?
8. Are individuals who name three closest friends that share their same tribe/religion more likely to participate in protest?

9. Are individuals who name three closest friends that share their same tribe/religion more likely to trust other people in their community?

Controls: gender, age, tribe, religion, education level, poverty index (measured as frequency without food/water/cash income), and political affiliation.

Empirical strategy: All of the above hypotheses will be tested using linear regression. First, the bivariate relationship will be tested with a single regressor. Then the controls will also be added. We will also look at heterogeneous effects. All regressions will include community and enumerator fixed effects.

Government interactions (G):

1. Are citizens who pay taxes more likely than those who admit that they do not pay taxes to adopt claim-making behavior and try to hold government accountable?
2. Are citizens who vote in elections more likely to adopt claim-making behavior to try and hold government accountable?
3. Are citizens who hold a voter ID card more likely to adopt claim-making behavior to try and hold government accountable?
4. Are citizens who claim Lagos as their state of origin (indigenes) or who were born in Lagos more likely to adopt claim-making behavior to try and hold government accountable?

The “claim-making” outcomes for these hypotheses include: willingness to contact a government official about a problem, sending a message to the Lagos State governor, and participate (or be willing to) in protests.

Controls: gender, age, tribe, religion, education level, poverty index (measured as frequency without food/water/cash income), and political affiliation.

Empirical strategy: The above hypotheses will be tested using linear regression. First, the bivariate relationship will be tested with a single regressor, then the controls will also be added. All regressions will include community and enumerator fixed effects.

Other Analyses

Measurement of Probabilities

Development of a “score” based on whether respondents correctly answer two different items related to concepts of probability:

1. Assigning a higher probability for going to the market in the next two weeks than going to the market in the next two days.

2. Correctly answering a question about a known probability (likelihood of blindly choosing fish from a pot with 2 pieces of fish and 8 pieces of meat). Since this is a 0-10, and the correct answer is 2, some answers can be “more correct” than others. So this item could be coded either dichotomously (“right” or “wrong”) or as a matter of degree (considering responses closer to the true answer as more correct).

We plan to explore how any results from models that include measures of probability of eviction vary based on this score, which could help diagnose measurement error.

Respondents were also asked how secure they feel in their home and how secure they feel relative to others. Although these are broader than the questions about eviction or demolition, and may include other threats, this is an alternative way of measuring perceived insecurity in place of the probability of eviction. To further explore the question about measurement of insecurity, we will also look at the outcomes in section U and the correlation in section C by this more generalized insecurity.

Test for latent variables

Property ownership is typically describes as a “bundle of rights” that includes various use rights. We will explore whether there is some latent variable underlying informal property rights even in the absence of a formal title (if there are sufficient observations in these overlapping categories of ownership).

Components for exploratory factor analysis:

- Does the landlord claim to own their land?
 - If no, who owns the land?
 - If yes, who was the land purchased from?
- How did the respondent acquire the structure?
- Did respondent need to get permission to build the structure?
- Would respondent need to get permission to make improvements?
- Does the landlord pay someone for the use of the land?
- Does the respondent pay Land Use Charge (property tax) to the state?

Survey experiments

- Eviction salience question order: described above under hypothesis set U.
- Vignette experiment: Respondents were read a vignette about a hypothetical person living a community like theirs that varied across two dimensions, homeownership and eviction threat (a 2x2 between subjects factorial design). This will test whether respondents associate being under an eviction threat with differences in political, community, and economic behavior. The outcomes were how likely the man would vote,

pay taxes, protest, help develop his community, and put a new roof on his house. We are interested in main effects and interaction effects.

Tenant + no eviction information	Tenant + threat of eviction by government
Landlord + no eviction information	Landlord + threat of eviction by government

- Community development list posted: We asked respondents about their likelihood of participating in community development projects, but we randomized whether they were told that the list of those interested in participating would be posted publicly for other community members to see or would be given to local leaders. This will test whether there is any plausibility of a social norm of contributing that is enforced by fellow community members.
 - Conditioning variables: We will test whether the likelihood of contribution for each of the treatment arms differs for individuals who live in more homogeneous communities (as measured in the community survey), as well as by individual characteristics: age, gender, tribe, religion, length of time living in that community, partisanship, income, social dependency, and education level.
- Personal and community normative beliefs: We asked respondents about their own normative beliefs and those of their fellow community members -- related to paying taxes, voting, and participating in protests. We randomized the order -- whether respondents were first asked about their own beliefs or their thoughts on other community members' beliefs. Here we will test whether there are any ordering effects.
- Public goods behavioral measure: At the very end of the survey respondents were given 200 NGN and told that they could either keep that money for themselves or choose to donate the money to the community, in which case the enumerator would add another 200 NGN, totalling 400 NGN for the community. Respondents were randomly told that the money for the community would be given to the Baale or the Community Development Association (CDA) Chairman. We will use this measure to test the levels of trust citizens have in these two local leaders by comparing the difference in means of the amount of money donated to each. We will also compare this behavioral outcome to differences in stated trust in these two types of leaders.

The above hypotheses will be tested using a standard difference-in-means test. In addition, we will use linear regression and include our standard controls (gender, age, tribe, religion, education level, poverty index, and political affiliation) and measures to investigate heterogeneous treatment effects. We will also include community and enumerator fixed effects.