Pre-Analysis Plan
Policing and Collective Action: Survey Experiment in Uganda

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Abstract

An extensive literature within comparative politics, human rights, and conflict examines the relationship between collective action and repression. Many of these studies use observational data to study the effect of repression on collective action or vice versa. So these studies are limited in their ability to address the thorny challenge of endogeneity (i.e., does repression affect mobilization or does collective action affect repressive behavior?). Additionally, these studies do not distinguish between 1) appropriate police action and excessive police force and 2) individuals' previous level of mobilization. Using a nationally representative survey of 2,000 Ugandans administered in July 2018, we investigate two questions: first, how different police actions affect citizens' support for the police and willingness to engage in collective action; and second, whether these effects are conditioned by whether individuals are already mobilized and engaging in collective action. We further examine heterogeneous treatment effects to explore whether these effects vary by respondents' support for the incumbent, prior police interactions, region, and gender. By examining the politics of policing in an authoritarian context, we hope to provide experimental evidence for when state-violence triggers political backlash, increasing collective action and decreasing support for the security apparatus.

1 Introduction and Objectives

In this project, we explore popular attitudes toward the security apparatus and the extent to which *appropriate* police action or *excessive* police force affects individuals' support for the police and their willingness to criticize or engage in direct collective action. Recognizing that individuals' perception of the police will be shaped by whether they are actively engaged in dissent or merely a bystander, we also examine the extent to which *observing* collective action and police action differs from *participating* in collective action when the police take action.[1]

To explore the potential impact of police force and collective action on support for the police and future collective action, we will field a survey experiment in Uganda. Uganda is an important case to examine the politics of policing. Uganda is a multiethnic autocracy, where Yoweri Museveni has maintained control since 1986. Multiparty elections were first held in 2006 but restrictions on free and open political spaces remain and the government limits political competition and represses dissent. In Uganda, two agencies are responsible for policing and securing Uganda's domestic affairs, the Uganda Police Force (UPF) and the Internal Security Organization (ISO) led by the Inspector General Police (IGP) and Security Minister, respectively. Importantly for this study, the UPF and ISO are controlled by the President.[2]

Understanding the politics of policing in autocracies requires us to unpack the two tasks that police officers face in authoritarian contexts. On one hand police officers serve as street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1971) in the provision of law and order as a public good. Alternatively, they serve as coercive agents of the state tasked with repressive capacity to ensure the autocrat's survival. Situating the study in this framework, we ask the following questions: Do individuals respond differently to police action based on perceptions of legiti-

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[1]Identifying the causal effect of police action on the actions of individuals raises several methodological challenges, including selection biases and endogeneity problems.

[2]The Ugandan security sector also includes the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) and the External Security Organization (ESO).

macy and appropriateness of force? To what extent are these responses conditioned by the individuals engagement (i.e. participating in or observing collective action)?

In this study, we hope to contribute to at least two different bodies of literature. First, by marshalling experimental evidence from an authoritarian context on the effect of police action on individuals and the conditioning effects of whether or not individuals are engaged in collective action, we add to the protest-repression nexus literature. Second, we hope to expand the research on the politics of policing by focusing on the interactions between the actors responsible for *implementing* repression or *providing* public security, *the police* and civilians.

2 Politics of Policing

2.1 Protest-Repression Nexus

An extensive literature examines the dynamics between repression and protest (Carey 2006, Gurr 1986, Lichbach 1995, 1987, Moore 1998, Opp 1994, Rasler 1996, Tilly 1978, Zimmerman 1980). This research has several methodological shortcomings. First, much of this research uses the state-year or another unit of time as the primary unit of analysis. This does not allow us to capture within country variation.

Second, the so called "protest-repression" nexus raises a endogeneity problem. On one hand, as Davenport (2007) writes, "when challenges to the status quo take place, authorities generally employ some form of repressive action to counter or eliminate the behavioral threat; in short, there appears to be a *Law of Coercive Responsiveness*." But we do not know whether repression deters or increases collective action or the direction of causality.

Third, the existing literature conflates *appropriate* police action (for example, a clash between police and a violent protester posing a security risk and breaking the law) and state repression (for example, police officers using excessive force and arresting protesters just for participating in a protest). Both of these events are likely to be captured in traditional

events based data sets like the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) or The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Theoretically, for important reasons, these interactions with the police are likely to have divergent effects on the way individuals respond to them. Methodologically, conflating police actions as the same without separating human rights violations/state repression from appropriate police action is likely to bias our analyses of how these actions condition political behavior of civilians. As one is providing safety and security and the other is restricting freedoms and violating human rights.

This project seeks to contribute to the protest-repression literature by using a survey experiment to examine whether individuals living in an authoritarian state respond differently to police action depending on 1) whether the police use excessive force and 2) whether the individual is a bystander or participant in the collective action.

There are several benefits of this study. First, by embedding the survey experiment in a nationally representative survey we are able to examine important patterns of within country variation. Second, by including three treatments: 1) prior collective action, 2) excessive police force, and 3) prior collective action and excessive police force, we are able to gain traction on the thorny endogeneity problem. Third, the study allows us to examine whether individuals respond differently to appropriate police action compared to repressive police action.

2.2   Street-Level Bureaucrats or Repressive Agents

We also hope to contribute to a growing body of literature on the politics of policing and the inherent principal-agent problem that emerges (Curtice 2018). Two perspectives within social science have explored the principal-agent problem between the government and their security apparatus, as government leaders do not directly provide law and order or repress collective action against the state.[3] First, from a policing perspective, law and order, and se-

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[3]A principal-agent problem is defined as a relationship in which "the agent has an informational advantage over the principal and takes actions that impact both players' payoffs. The principal has the formal authority, but in (principal-agent relationships), the attention is on a particular form of formal authority: the authority

curity more broadly, is considered a public good provided by street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1971). Within American Politics, scholars have examined the adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with policing because policing requires high levels of discretion (Wilson 1968); results in informational asymmetries between officers (agents) and policing principals (Goldstein 1960, Wilson 1968); and monitoring and oversight are costly and not always effective (Goldstein 1960, Wilson 1968, Yokum, Ravishankar and Coppock 2017).[4] Much of this literature explores the problems principals face when they are concerned about selecting the wrong officers or ensuring selected officers remain honest.[5]

Second, from a human rights perspective, studies examine how the governments structure their security apparatus to ensure repressive compliance (Hassan 2016); deter threats from coups (Svolik 2012); and evade responsibility for human rights abuses (DeMeritt 2012).[6] For example, in autocracies, coercive institutions are "a dictator's final defense in pursuit of political survival, but also (the government's) chief obstacle to achieving that goal" (Greitens 2016). Yet many of these studies, drawing from the human rights perspective, focus on the dynamics between the government and the military overlooking the role of the police. Svolik (2012), for example, refers to the soldiers as the "dictator's repressive agent of last resort."

Importantly, the literature either assumes that police officers are street-level bureaucrats or focuses on the repressive capacity of the military. This is problematic as it either assumes away the politics of policing or overlooks the security personnel most likely to be coopted by the state to engage in repression. In the first case, the prominent assumption is that if principals solve the moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with policing

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(of the principal) to impose incentives on the agent" (Miller 1993).

[4]There are two types of principal-agent problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. In adverse selection, the principal selects and agent who likely does not share the principal's preference because she does not know ex ante why the agent makes their decisions (i.e., information, beliefs, and values). Moral hazard occurs because agents might shirk if they are not monitored completely by their principal (Moe 1984).

[5]Policing research in the US mostly focuses on various strategies policing principals pursue to overcome adverse selection, including, for example, aggressive or authoritarian personality of officers (Balch 1972, Twersky-Glasner 2005), conservative ideology (Fielding and Fielding 1991), and racial bias (Ebergardt et al. 2004, Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007).

[6]For additional studies on this principal-agent problem from the human rights perspective, see Cohen and Nordås (2015), Conrad and Moore (2010), Curtice (2018), Mitchell (2004), Mitchell, Carey and Butler (2014), Mitchell (2012).

governments will be able to effectively provide law and order. However, this does not consider that leaders might be motivated by the political survival rather than by protecting the physical integrity rights and property rights of civilians. In the second case, although dictators might rely on soldiers as their repressive agents of last resort, for many governments it is the police who are the agents of repression in ordinary times.

Existing studies have explored this classic principal-agent problem, as incumbents do not directly engage in repression or the provision of law and order (DeMeritt 2015, Lipsky 1971, Svolik 2012). Yet many of the studies within comparative politics and human rights literature focus on the dynamics between the government and the military rather than exploring the dynamics between the government, the police, and the public.

To better understand patterns of human rights violations, election violence, and criminal activity, we need to examine the security agents tasked with the everyday challenges associated with the provision of law and order – the police.[7] Additionally, one critical assumption in the American politics literature on policing is that principals prefer police officers who protect the rights of individuals. In many comparative contexts, this assumption is no longer tenable. Alternatively, we argue that incumbents prefer policing agents who ensure the political survival of the government.[8]

Consequently, to understand the multiple dimensions of policing in autocracies, we need to compare the various responses of individuals to police action that could be seen as providing security as a public good and action taken by the police that could be seen as repression.

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[7]Conrad and Hu (N.d.) have a working paper considering whether judicial oversight might reduce police violence in India.

[8]In highly institutionalized democracies, police brutality or human rights abuses might hurt the incumbent. However, even abuses in the US context like Ferguson, Missouri or Standing Rock might not hurt incumbents.

3 Case Selection

The study will be conducted in Uganda, a multiethnic autocracy.[9] President Yoweri Museveni is the current head of state and has been in power since 1986. He is from the Banyankole (father) and Banyarwanda (mother) ethnic groups – both ethnic groups are subgroups of the Bantu peoples. Kizza Besigye, the primary opposition leader in Uganda, is from the Bahororo ethnic group.

Table 1 displays the ethnic composition of the Ugandan population as of 2014. Ethnic groups in Uganda are historically clustered in regions. The Acholi ethnic group is predominately geographically clustered in northern Uganda. The Acholi are known for opposing Museveni's regime resulting in the infamous insurgency, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. However, other Acholi rebel groups also formed to oppose Museveni in the early years of his regime.

Table 1: Ethnic Groups in Uganda

Ethnic Groups	2002		2014	
	# (Millions)	%	# (Millions)	%
Baganda	4.13	17.7	5.56	16.5
Banyankore	2.33	10.0	3.22	9.6
Basoga	2.07	8.9	2.96	8.8
Bakiga	1.68	7.2	2.39	7.1
Iteso	1.57	6.7	2.36	7.0
Langi	1.49	6.4	2.13	6.3
Bagisu	1.12	4.8	1.65	4.9
Acholi	1.14	4.9	1.47	4.4
Lugbara	1.02	4.4	1.10	3.3
Other Ethnic Groups	6.76	31.4	10.8	32.1
Total	23.29	100	33.6	100

In addition to ethnic diversity, Uganda has experienced variation in conflict with a civil war between the government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army affecting northern Uganda for over twenty years displacing over an estimated 1.2 million people into internally displacement camps. Other insecurities in the north include clashed by the karachunas,

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[9]In Uganda ethnic communities are more commonly referred to as tribes. This pre-analysis plan uses these terms interchangeably.

Karimojong warriors, in Karamoja region and neighbouring districts.

Additionally, multiparty elections were first held in 2006 but restrictions on free and open political spaces remain and the government limits political competition and represses dissent. Although Museveni won the last three elections with an average vote-share of 60.27 percent, elections were generally panned by international and domestic observers as lacking electoral credibility and the political rights of various opposition groups were severely curtailed and in many cases violated.

Table 2 shows the administrative units and divisions in Uganda, as of 2016.

Table 2: Administrative and Political Units in Uganda

112	Number of districts
249	Number of counties
290	Number of constituencies
1,397	Number of sub counties
7,431	Number of parishes
57,842	Number of villages
28,010	Number of polling stations
15,277,196	Number of registered voters

3.1 Why Focus on the Uganda Police Force

Why focus on the role of the UPF rather than other repressive agents such as Uganda's military, the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF)? This project focuses on the UPF because they are the security force most likely to engage in the activity we associate with repression.

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) provides disaggregated data on political violence and protest events. In Uganda from 1997 to 2016, ACLED reports that the UPDF and UPF were collectively involved in 2,238 events of political violence and social unrest with the UPF involved in 26 percent of them (Raleigh et al. 2010).

ACLED provides five categories of political violence and protest events: 1) battle; 2) remote violence; 3) riots/protests; 4) strategic development; and 5) violence against civilians

(Raleigh et al. 2009). They define a battle as "a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location" (Raleigh et al. 2009). Remote violence is defined as an event in which the tool for engaging in conflict did not require the physical presence of the perpetrator.[10] Riots/protests include political events that involve either protesters or rioters, depending on whether it is violent. Strategic development captures events that are "important within a state's political history, and may be triggers of future events, but are not directly violent" (Raleigh et al. 2009).[11] Violence against civilians includes events that involve deliberate violent acts perpetrated by an organized political group such as a rebel, militia or government force against unarmed non-combatants.

Table 3 shows the breakdown of these political events by the involvement of the security forces in Uganda. Although there are concerns with under-reporting within events data, the ACLED data show important variation regarding which state agency engages in repression. The UPDF were involved in more political violence events however 95.1% of the events involving the UPDF were either battle or remote violence events, which are the categories we would typically associate with national security.

When we consider the political violence and social events involving the police we see that 86.82 % of the events involving the UPF include political violence relating to riots, protests, strategic developments, and violence against civilians, which are the categories more associated with state repression.[12]

Consequently, exploring the dynamics that shape the effectiveness of the UPF will provide important insights to understanding the various dynamics that shape whether or not agents of repression are effective.

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[10]These violent actions such as bombings, IED attacks, drone activity, mortar and missile attacks.

[11]These events include arrests of key political figures, political mobilizations, and rallies.

[12]Here are a few examples of the events ACLED captures: 1) Norbert Mao arrested during walk to work protests in the Kampala suburb; 2) Thirty residents of Luweero District were arrested after leading a procession to take food to imprisoned opposition leader, Kizza Besigye; 3) Police battled protesters engaged in walk to work demonstrations with live ammunition, shooting and killing three demonstrators; and 4) Following fresh walk to work protests, police fired tear gas and stones were hurled back at them in a brief clash during which Besigye, who stood against Museveni in February elections, was bundled into a police van.

Table 3: Political Violence and Social Unrest Events in Uganda from 1997 to 2016

Conflict Event	Military Forces (UPDF)		Police Forces (UPF)	
	#	%	#	%
Battle	1,543	93.29	77	13.18
Remote violence	30	1.81	0	0
Riots/Protests	4	0.24	330	56.51
Strategic development	14	0.85	78	13.36
Violence against civilians	63	3.81	99	16.95
Total Events	1,654	100	584	100

Data

Data for this project are from a panel survey conducted through Twaweza's Sauti za Wananchi project and Ipsos in Uganda.

The target population for Sauti za Wananchi includes Ugandans aged 18 years and above. According to the 2014 Population and Housing Census by the Uganda National Bureau of Statistics, Uganda had a total population of 34,634,650; with 76% (26,196,641) living in the rural areas while 24% (8,438,009) in the urban areas. In terms of gender, there are 16,897,849 males and 17,736,801 females. The 2014 adult population is about 45% of the total population (15,597,619), and out of these, 72% (11,248,647) were in the rural areas while 28% (4,348,972) in the urban areas. In terms of gender, there are 7,218,526 (46%) male and 8,379,093 (54%) female adults.[13]

Sampling

A multi-stage stratified sampling approach was used to achieve a representative sample of the total population of 18 years and older.[14] The sample frame is based on the 2014 Uganda Population and Housing Census. The various stages of the selection of the sample are discussed below.[15]

The sample is meant to be a representative cross-section of all adult citizens in Uganda.

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[13]The total number of households enumerated was 79,303.

[14]This section draws directly from Twaweza's technical paper as sampling was done by Twaweza.

[15]Sauti za Wananchi explains the multi-stage sampling design in their technical paper.

Twaweza's objective was to give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of selection for interview. This goal was achieved by (a) strictly applying random selection at every stage of sampling and (b) applying sampling with probability proportionate to population size at the Enumeration Area (EA) sampling stage.

Sauti za Wananchi used a sample of 2,000 households in 200 enumeration areas (EAs) which provided estimates at standard precision levels (EAs were our Primary Sampling Units or PSUs).[16] A population of 2,000 households in 200 EAs were chosen, both to allow for sub-group analysis and to safeguard precision given that attrition is expected in a phone panel survey. The sample universe for the Sauti za Wananchi included all adult citizens in Uganda. That is, they excluded as individual main respondent anyone who has not attained the age of 18 years on the day of the survey. Sauti za Wananchi followed the approach set by the Uganda National Bureau of Statistics.

The Sauti za Wananchi Sampling took place in three stages: in the first stage EAs were sampled randomly from specified EA strata; in the second stage households were sampled randomly from EA household lists; and in the third stage one adult household member was selected as respondent randomly from the adult household roster.

Stage 1: Stratification and EA sampling

The aim was to create a sample enabling us to provide precise estimates in two domains: rural and urban. Sample stratification took place according to location (rural/urban). Since Twaweza had good reasons to believe many SzW outcomes of interest will be correlated with rural-urban location (e.g. welfare measures, public service delivery indicators) it was statistically sound to stratify on this dimension. The proportion of the sample in each stratum was the same as the stratum proportion in the national population as indicated by census data. Since the number of EAs to be sampled from each stratum was proportional to the stratum population size Twaweza expected proportional representation of the population

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[16]Sample size calculations provided in Twaweza's technical paper show that with 10 households per EA, a sample of about 150 EAs would be sufficient for a confidence interval of +/- 5 percentage points.

in the sample. EAs were selected using probability proportionate to population size (PPPS) using the EA population numbers provided by the Uganda National Bureau of Statistics. Once the participating EAs were selected, the corresponding EA maps were obtained from Uganda National Bureau of Statistics. Since it was expected that some EAs would have to be replaced because of network coverage problems, or inaccessibility etc., in such anticipated cases, reserve EAs were similarly selected.

Stage 2: Household sampling

Upon arrival in the selected EAs, a full listing exercise was conducted using the EA maps. This listing exercise gave each household an equal chance of participating in the survey. Once the EA household list was completed, 10 Main Households were randomly selected from the list. The random selection was done in the presence of village or street leaders. This was mainly done because Twaweza intended to hand over mobile phones and chargers to the randomly selected households. In accordance with the standard (UBOS) practice, they defined a household as individuals living under the same roof and eating from the same cooking pot. By this definition, a household did not include persons who are currently living elsewhere for purposes of studies or work. Nor did a household include domestic workers or temporary visitors (even if they eat from the same pot or slept there on the previous night). In multi-household dwelling structures (like blocks of flats, compounds with multiple spouses, or backyard dwellings for renters, relatives, or household workers), each household was treated as a separate sampling unit. Given that attrition is expected in phone panel surveys, Twaweza randomly selected two households from a list of the households in the EA that already owned a mobile phone. The idea is to replace households dropping out of the survey using this set of reserve households.

Stage 3: Individual respondent sampling

When Twaweza selected a participating household, they went to the household and sought the consent of the head of households. In the consent form they explained the nature of the project and the approach used to randomly select his or her household as a participating household. Further to that Twaweza also explained to the head of household that an adult would be randomly selected from the household to participate in Sauti za Wananchi. Once the head of household had consented to a household member participating in the survey, they used a Kish grid (random number table) to randomly select eligible household members. For practical reasons, they selected the respondent from among persons in the household who will be available for the baseline interview and who are expected to be available for a phone interview.

4 Survey Experiment

Do individuals respond differently to appropriate police action (i.e., legally sanctioned force used to protect the community) compared to excessive use of violence by the police? Additionally, are these responses conditioned by whether individuals were by-standers to these events rather than active participants?

An extensive body of human rights and conflict literature considers the protest-repressive nexus. Yet we still do not know whether individuals respond differently when the police use appropriate as opposed to excessive force. For example, if police officers take action to secure a situation where an individual is using violence, we would expect support for the police to increase. However, if the police engage in excessive force which is likely to be perceived as inappropriate or even repressive, we would expect support for the police to decrease.

But excessive force by the police is likely to impact more than just respondents' support for the police. Authoritarian regimes use repression to *punish* individuals who are engaged in collective action and *deter* others from joining. So excessive violence by the police is likely

to influence whether individuals talk about the collective action and whether individuals engage in further collective action.

Furthermore, these expectations are likely conditioned by the individuals' level of involvement in a political activity. For example, whether an individual is participating in a form of collective action such as a rally, protest or riot or whether they are a bystander merely observing it is likely to influence the response of individuals.

In our survey experiment, we randomly assign our 2,000 respondents to one of the following four groups: a control and three treatment groups.

Control: `Hypothetically, imagine that you observed but did not participate in a rally where the police were providing safety and security. An individual at the rally became disruptive and the police arrested him.`

Treatment 1: `Hypothetically, imagine that you participated in a rally where the police were providing safety and security. An individual at the rally became disruptive and the police arrested him.`

Treatment 2: `Hypothetically, imagine that you observed but did not participate in a rally where the police were providing safety and security. An individual at the rally became disruptive and the police arrested him and others using excess force.`

Treatment 3: `Hypothetically, imagine that you participated in a rally where the police were providing safety and security. An individual at the rally became disruptive and the police arrested him and others using excess force.`

4.1 Dependent Variables: Police Support, Public Criticism and Direct Collective Action

We have three outcome measures of interest: whether respondents support the actions the police took; publicly criticize the actions the police took; or protest the actions the police took. After the enumerator reads the randomly assigned prompt, respondents are asked whether

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they `strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree,` or `strongly agree` with the following three statements.

> R1: You would support the actions the police took
>
> R2: You would publicly criticize the actions the police took
>
> R3: You would protest the actions the police took

We hope to measure the response of participants based on the costs. For example, we argue that disagreeing with the first responses (support the actions the police took) is less costly than to publicly criticize the actions the police took.

The personal costs/risks to participants are related to threats that mobilization poses to the government. We can assume that authoritarian regimes prefer civilians support the actions the police take. However, they are likely to take actions to deter threats that could emerge from civilians criticizing or protesting the state's actions.

We can conceive of these costs as being the social, psychological, or physical costs associated with the participants hypothetical action. Protesting poses a higher cost to respondents than criticizing the government. Although expressing a lack of support could also be seen as costly, relative to the other actions the risks are lower. Accordingly, we assume the following rank order of costs for the outcome variables:

$$R1 < R2 < R3 \tag{1}$$

4.2   Independent Variables: Police Action and Individual Mobilization

We have two independent variables of interest: first, a binary indicator for whether individuals are participating in collective action not merely observing it; and second, a binary indicator for whether police use excessive force and arrest more people than just the individual causing the disruption. These measures indicate whether individuals received Treatment 1 or Treatment 2.

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We also consider the effect of participating in collective action and excess police force (Treatment 3). We consider this possibility by employing a dummy variable for whether respondent received Treatment 3, which includes the treatment language from the prompts for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2.

We estimate the treatment effects by using the following benchmark Ordinary Least Squares statistical model.

$$Support_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T3_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{2}$$

where i indexes respondents, $T1_i$, $T2_i$, and $T3_i$ are indicator variables for the respective randomized "treatment" assignments coded as 1 and 0 otherwise, ϵ_i captures stochastic error. Two parameter capturing whether i participated in the rally or whether the police use excessive force are β_1 and β_2. Whereas, β_3 captures both participation and excessive force.

4.3 Support for Police Action Hypotheses

Whether individuals support the actions police take will likely depend on the perceptions of appropriateness of the action and the extent to which individuals feel safe. Police officers arresting an individual who causes a disruption at a rally will be seen as more appropriate than police officers arresting several people with excessive force.

Additionally, the response of individuals will be conditions by the respondents level of involvement in the rally. There is likely to be more support for an action that makes an individual feel safe (participating in the rally and the police arrest the individuals that causes the disruption relative to people observing the interaction). Yet these effects will be different when individuals participate and the police use excess force, as they will feel more threatened and less secure.

Consequently, we have the following hypotheses regarding the level of support for the action the police take.

First, if the police arrest an individual disrupting the rally, they are using appropriate

force. Individuals participating in the rally are more likely to support the police's actions as they will feel safer (more protected) during the rally.

Hypothesis 1. $B_1 > 0$

Second, if the police arrest an individual disrupting the rally and others using excessive force, individuals will be less likely to support the actions taken by the police.

Hypothesis 2. $B_2 < 0$

Third, if the police arrest an individual disrupting the rally and others using excessive force *and* the respondents were participating in the rally they will be even less likely to support the actions the police take.

Hypothesis 3. $B_3 < 0$

4.4   Prior Mobilization

Individuals engaged in collective action are likely to have lower "barriers of entry" to further collective action. If this is the case, we should expect study participants who received the collective action treatment to be more willing to engage in political dissent such as public criticism of the state's security apparatus or further collective action such as protests. Formally,

Hypothesis 4. $\gamma_1 > 0$

Hypothesis 5. $\tau_1 > 0$

4.5   Deterrence and Backlash Hypotheses

In addition to levels of support for police action, this study design allows us examine the effect of collective action and excess force on the willingness of individuals to take costly action; specifically, the willingness of individuals to publicly criticize or protest police action. To

consider these possibilities, we estimate the treatment effects on the two remaining outcome variables of interest with the following statistical models.

$$Criticize_i = \alpha + \gamma_1 T1_i + \gamma_2 T2_i + \gamma_3 T3_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{3}$$

$$Protest_i = \alpha + \tau_1 T1_i + \tau_2 T2_i + \tau_3 T3_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{4}$$

A perennial question in the protest-repression nexus literature is whether protests affect repression or vise versa. This design allows us to consider 1) whether individuals already mobilized are more likely to engage in collective action; and 2) whether excess violence (state repression) increases or decreases whether individuals take costly action.

We test two theories relating to mobilization and repression: *deterrence* and *backlash* hypotheses. The observable implication from the deterrence hypothesis is that repression "excess force and arrests" decreases collective action. Tilly (1978) defines repression as a mechanism of control to raise the contender's cost to engage in collective action. Accordingly, we should expect that repressive action will be conditioned by the cost to actors or risks to them taking the action. Repressing opponents by arresting them or using excessive police force increases the cost for individuals who take specific actions (i.e., publicly criticizing the government or protesting). In repressive environments, the police action is no longer about providing public security or safety for the citizens; rather it protects the interests of the regime. This intuition underlines the logic of deterrence. That is, state coercive agents employ repression to raise contenders' costs to mobilize, which is likely to *deter* them from engaging in future collective action.

The *backlash hypothesis* has the alternative expectation. That is, repression increases collective action by individuals. Similar to the support hypotheses above, we might expect that repressive action increases the willingness of respondents to publicly criticize or protest police action.

We can express the *deterrence* hypotheses formally given Equations 3 and 4 as follows:

Hypothesis 6. $\gamma_2 < 0$

Hypothesis 7. $\tau_2 < 0$

Alternatively, the formal expression of the *backlash* hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 8. $\gamma_2 > 0$

Hypothesis 9. $\tau_2 > 0$

4.6   Conditioning Effects of Mobilization

How individuals respond to excessive force by the police is likely conditioned by their proximity to the police action. Particularly, study participants responses are likely to be conditioned by whether they observed the interaction between the police and those engaged in collective action (*By-stander effect*) or whether they were engaged in collective action when the police used excessive force (*Mobilization effect*). The parameter of interests from Equation 3 and 4 capturing the effect of the collective action and excessive force treatments are γ_3 and τ_3, respectively.

Heterogeneous Effects

The empirical design allows us to explore additional fine grained tests. There are several potential moderators of support. In addition to the analysis above we will explore levels the heterogeneous effects for respondents' attributes and characteristics.

- By education level of respondent

- By political activity of respondent

- By past police experience of respondent

- By insecurity of respondent

- By economic status of respondent

- By level of respondent trust in governmental institutions

- By gender of respondent

5 Social Media Tax Protest and Police Violence: A Discontinuity Analyses

In addition to the study above, we will leverage real-world events that occurred in Uganda to employ a quasi-random design examining whether the social media tax protest and subsequent police violence condition how study participants respond to questions of police violence and collective action.

Mid-survey experiment, Ugandan police used tear gas and bullets to break up a street protest on July 11, 2018 against a new tax levied against social media users. The protest was organized by a popular member of parliament for Kyadondo East, Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, also known as Bobi Wine. These events provide a potential discontinuity, which we will leverage to examine how individuals respond after police use teargas and live fire to deter collective action.

Ugandan police used tear gas and bullets to break up a street protest Wednesday against a new tax targeting social media users. Two protesters were arrested in downtown Kampala, the capital, after a scuffle in which some policemen were assaulted, said Luke Owoyesigire, a spokesman for Kampala police. The tax is argued to curtail political freedoms by restricting freedom of expression online. The police used force to break up the protest claiming that Ssentamu and the other protest organizers did not notify them of their plans.

This important episode occurred while our data collection was ongoing. The research firm had completed 1648 interviews and were yet to contact the remaining 352 respondents. Consequently, we are able to see how approximately 20% of study participants respond to our

questions after the above events occurred. This discontinuity allows us to examine whether a salient collective action event where the police use force affects how study participants respond.

Research Ethics and Security

The Research Ethics Committee of Mildway has approved the study in addition to the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology (reference number SS 4302). The study was determined exempt from further review or approval by Emory University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) on May 31, 2018 (IRB00104491). Research on policing in an electoral autocracy and post-conflict environment raises unique ethical challenges similar to challenges in conflict areas (Wood, 2006). We are mindful of these challenges and worked with domestic research teams and a registered Research Ethics Committee in Uganda to overcome them.

5.1 Data Security Procedures/Confidentiality

Data accessed by the PIs will be de-identified. We will not have access to the list of human subjects at any point in the study.

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